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Abstract  
 
The  paper  focuses  on  the  demographic  and  labour  market  consequences  of  the  dramatic 
decline in fertility that has characterized China starting at the beginning of the ‘50s. It is 
shared opinion that a sustained decline in fertility below replacement level will provoke a 
decline in Total population, an even more pronounced decline in Working age population and 
very relevant ageing phenomena. I have recently shown that, on the contrary and coherently 
with empirical evidence, a decline in fertility provokes a structural lack of labour supply that 
determines positive migration balances and, finally, positive demographic trends. The paper 
applies the same approach to China with similar results. The decline in fertility, determined 
by the process of economic development and its impact on education and urbanization, but 
promoted also trough the one-child policy, will provoke a relevant and growing structural 
lack of labour supply, even in the hypothesis that Chinese employment growth should sharply 
decline. The implication is that in order to continue its road to economic growth and social 
development,  China  will  have  to  rely  on  large  and  growing  migration  flows  that  will 
determine a demographic expansion. In conclusion, the decline in fertility, actively pursued to 
set a ceiling to population growth, will end up provoking the opposite result. The uncertainty 
about the age structure of the Chinese population makes it impossible to determine in which 
year China will start to be affected by serious labour shortages. Our scenarios do however 
clearly show that China will reach the Lewis turning point in the next few years and before 
the middle of the century will become the world largest importer of labour. Our analysis does 
therefore clearly suggest that any legal restriction to fertility and territorial mobility is totally 
unwarranted, and that China should start to consider educational and labour policies aimed to 
mitigate labour shortages. It also indicates the necessity to start an in depth discussion of 
which immigration and social integration policies could better serve the interests of China, on 
the light both of the experiences of other countries, and of the role that China wants to play in 
the international arena.  
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   3 
There is, of course, the abstract possibility 
that the number of people will become so 
great that limits will have to be set to their 
increase.  But  if  at  some  stage  communist 
society finds itself obligated to regulate the 
production of human beings, …., it will be 
precisely this society and this society alone 
which will carry this out without difficulty. 
 (Engels, 1971:119) 
1. Introduction 
China economic growth and its impact on the global economic and political arena are 
at the centre of increasing attention. In 2009 China’s GDP growth has ranked first in the 
world and China has shown the capacity to deal with the global financial crisis better than any 
other country. In 2010, the record growth of the first quarter (+11.9 per cent) did already 
clearly indicate that China was going to return to a two digit rate of growth. In the longer-
term China’s GDP is projected to surpass the American GDP by 2020, after having become 
the second largest during the current year.  
While the sustainability of China’s economic growth has been and is largely debated 
from a macroeconomic perspective, the shear size of its population and the widespread idea 
of the presence of a large reservoir of rural labour have prevented to consider the possibility 
that in not too far a future China could be affected by a structural lack of labour supply, 
although the presence of labour shortages
1, signals of an increasing wage pressure
2, and of 
growing phenomena of illegal immigration
3 have been reported by national and international 
observers and are attracting growing attention from the media. 
The  paper  will  focus  on  the  labour  market  and  economic  implications  of  the  fast 
decline in fertility that has characterized China starting at the beginning of the ‘50s. It is 
shared opinion that the decline in fertility below replacement level will determine a relevant 
reduction of total population, an even more pronounced decline of Working Age Population 
(WAP), and progressive ageing phenomena. A lot of attention has been paid to the problem of 
ageing and its consequences on the welfare systems; much less attention to the impact of a 
declining WAP on the labour market and to its implications in terms of migration flows. The 
Report on Replacement Migration published by the United Nations population Division in 
2000 
4 represents the most notable exception.  
The Report -that was received with skepticism and widespread criticisms
5, based more 
on ideological standings than well-formulated arguments- sustains the unorthodox position 
that immigrations represents the only possible solution to a declining WAP. The Report raised 
a vey relevant issue, put the right question and, in my opinion, provided the correct answer. 
However, the definition of Replacement migration only on the basis of demographic criteria 
represents a serious limit of this otherwise very relevant concept.  
The Report adheres to the same logic adopted by the standard approach to demographic 
projections that the demographic and economic spheres are independent from each other and, 
therefore, that population can be forecasted only on the basis of hypothesis about fertility, 
                                                        
1 See for instance:” Defying Global Slumps, China Has Labour Shortages”, The New York Times, New York 
edition, February 27, 2010. 
2 The last empirical evidence is provided by the increase in the minimum wage decided by the city of Guangzhou 
starting May 1st.  
3 The China daily as recently reported a growing presence of Vietnamese illegal workers in the Province of Guanxi 
and in numerous other Southern China cities and areas, where immigrants find jobs not only in factories, but also 
as  farmers.  www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-04/11/content_9713105.htm.  Illegal  immigration  in  Guangzhou 
from Vietnam, Myanmar and Africa has been reported by the press since 2008.  
4 Population Division, 2000. 
5 See inter alia J.R. Bermingham (2001), L.F.  Bouvier (2001), D.A. Coleman, 2000 and 2002; G. McNicoll 
(2000 ), F.A.B. Meyerson (2001).   4 
mortality and migration. The only difference of the exercise presented by the Report is that 
immigration is not assumed on the basis of past trends, but estimated in relation to three 
demographic objectives: 1) to maintain the size of total population at the highest level it 
would reach in the absence of migration after 1995; 2) to maintain the size of working-age 
population (15 to 64 years) at the highest level it would reach in the absence of migration 
after 1995; 3) to maintain the potential support ratio (PSR)
6 at the highest level it would reach 
in the absence of migration after 1995
7. These three targets, as well as the corresponding 
values of Replacement migration, do not have any relevant labour market implications and, 
therefore, are of little interest to economic analysis and policy formulations.  
In recent papers
8, I have shown that a prolonged decline in fertility will produce a 
structural lack of labour supply that can be defined as a situation in which labour supply and 
labour demand can not be equated by the real wage. In the short run labour force cannot be 
created and its maximum level is determined by the size of working age population. In a 
situation of structural lack of labour supply, the local labour force is not sufficient even to 
maintain the existing level of production and foreign labour is necessary to ensure economic 
growth. The size of the structural lack of labour is jointly determined by the rate of decline in 
WAP and by the rate of growth of production, given the activity rate of the local population. 
The size of the structural lack of labour determines the level of the migration balance. This 
allows  providing  an  economic  definition  of  Replacement  migration  as  the  international 
migration  needed  to  offset  the  structural  lack  of  labour  supply  and  keep  the  real  wage 
constant. 
I  have  also  proposed  estimates  of  the  future  structural  lack  of  labour  supply  and 
migration  balances  for  two  areas  [EU15,  NWC  (Australia,  Canada,  USA)],  and  for  four 
countries (Russia, Japan, Italy and Moldova) in alternative scenarios of employment growth
9. 
The main conclusions are that the size of the immigration flows needed by Europe, Australia 
and  Canada,  but  not  by  the  United  States,  will  be  much  larger  than  those  presently 
hypothesized  by  United  Nations  projections  and  that,  contrary  to  existing  forecasts,  the 
population of countries with below replacement fertility will necessarily increase due to the 
immigration flows induced by economic development and demographic trends and the higher 
fertility of the migrants.  
This paper applies the same approach to China with similar results. The decline in 
fertility, determined by the process of economic development and its impact on education and 
urbanization,  but  promoted  also trough the  one-child  policy,  will provoke  a  relevant  and 
growing structural lack of labour supply, even in the hypothesis that Chinese employment 
growth  should  sharply  decline.  The  implication  is  that  in  order  to  continue  its  road  to 
economic growth and social development, China will have to rely on a large and growing 
quota  of  immigrant  labour.  The  decline  in  fertility,  actively  pursued  to  set  a  ceiling  to 
population growth, will end up provoking the opposite result.  
The first part of the paper briefly describes the successful way by which China has 
faced, between 1950 and 2010, the challenges generated by the demographic trends provoked 
by the so called “demographic transition”
10 in the areas of education and employment.  
The demographic projections produced by the Population Division (PD) for 2010-2050 
are then analyzed and discussed. Both the medium and low variants show that China’s WAP 
will  dramatically  decline,  the  amount  of  the  decline  depending  on  the  hypothesis  about 
fertility.  
                                                        
6 The PRS is the ratio of the working-age population (15 to 64 years) to the old-age population (65 years or older). 
7  The  exercise  was  carried  on  for  8  countries  (France,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  Republic  of  Korea,  Russian 
Federation, United Kingdom, United States) and two areas (Europe and European Union).  
8 M. Bruni (2010), (2009a), (2009b), (2008)  
9 M. Bruni 2009a 
10  The  classical  model  of  the  demographic  transition  envisages  the  passage  from  an  equilibrium  condition, 
characterized by high fertility and mortality rates, to an equilibrium situation characterized by low fertility and 
mortality rates, migrations playing no role in attaining such results. While there are ne empirical indications that 
such a transition will take place, no theoretical arguments have been put forward to show its long–run inevitability.    5 
The PD forecasts are based on an age population structure that largely differs from the 
one estimated by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (CNBS), being characterized by 
higher  values  for  the  younger  generations  and  lower  values  for  the  older  ones.  The 
consequences  of  such  difference  on  future  WAP  are  explored  through  two  comparable 
projections  of  the  Chinese  population,  one  using  the  CNSB  structure,  the  other  the  PD 
structure. The projections, whose aim is only that of producing a demographic canvas to 
outline and discuss alternative policies, are based on the simple hypothesis of constant age-
specific mortality rates and constant fertility rates. These projections, while confirming the 
general trends of the UN projections, point out the extreme relevance of the initial population 
structure in assessing the moment in which the structural lack of labour supply will become 
manifest, and the size of the phenomenon.  
The  implications  of  both  projections  for  the  Chinese  labour  market  are  separately 
discussed for two periods: 2008-23 and 2023-2048. In the first period, the level and trends of 
WAP depend only on the initial population structure since all the young people that will enter 
working age are already born. A set of hypothesis on employment growth allows measuring 
the level and timing of 1) the structural lack of labour supply and 2) the corresponding level 
of  replacement  migration,  as  previously  defined.  Our  elaborations  show  that  population 
structure plays a major role in assessing the two variables, but in both cases China will soon 
become the world largest importer of labour force. In the second period, the level and trends 
of  the  structural  lack  of  labour  supply  will  depend  on  the  future  trends  in  fertility  (and 
therefore also on the decision of the Chinese government whether to keep or abolish the one-
child policy), on the number of immigrants and their rate of fertility and on the demographic, 
economic and social policies that will be adopted during the first period. A major role will be 
played  by  the  rate  of  employment  growth,  and  therefore  by  the  speed,  typology  and 
geographical distribution of China’s economic growth.  
The novelty and complexity of the demographic and economic scenarios suggested by 
the paper, coupled with the uncertainty about the age structure of the Chinese population, 
make both premature and presumptuous to try to fully assess the impact of demographic 
trends on economic development and growth. However, our analysis clearly suggests that any 
legal  restriction  to  fertility  and  territorial  mobility  is  totally  unwarranted,  and  other 
educational  and  labour  policies  addressing  the  problem  of  labour  shortages  should  be 
considered as soon as possible. It also indicates the necessity to start an in depth discussion of 
which immigration and social integration policies could better serve the interests of China on 
the light both of the experience of other countries, and of the role that China wants to play in 
the international arena.  
Demographic transition theory has for long time postulated that the decline in fertility 
would have leveled out at replacement level, ruling out the possibility of population decline. 
This idea has been always strongly imbedded in economic theory that was developed in a 
phase of population growth. In the classical model the supply of labour is unlimited. Lewis 
model provides an influential application of this hypothesis. In neoclassical model the supply 
of labour is limited, but it is assumed that population is characterized by a long-run non-
negative trend.  
At present there are no doubts that, in absence of international migration, a growing 
number of developed and developing countries will register a dramatic decline in WAP that in 
its turn will provoke a structural lack of labour supply, the size of which will depend on the 
rate of growth of employment. The paper suggests that this should bring to the forefront the 
theoretical  and  policy  implications  of  this  new  demographic  perspective  for  the  single 
countries, for the development of a future international labour market and for the political and 
economic relationships between, on one hand, countries affected by a structural lack of labour 
supply and, on the other, countries affected by a structural excess of labour supply. China 
could represent the most interesting arena for the development of new ideas and innovative 
policies.   6 
2. China’s past demographic challenges: 1950-2010 
11 
In 1950, with a total population of around 545 million, China was the country with the 
biggest  population  in  the  world  and  accounted  for  21.5%  of  world  population.  It  also 
accounted for the largest share of births (more than ¼) and provided the biggest contribution 
to the increase in world population (around 23 per cent).  
In 2010, China is still the most populated country in the world. With around 1,334 
million
12 inhabitants it accounts for 19 per cent of world population; its contribution to the 
total number of births registered in the planet has, however, has decreased to 13.3 per cent 
and its contribution to the increase in world population to 11 per cent.   
Between 1950 and 2010, the Chinese population has increased by around 809 million 
(148 per cent), while at least 8.6 million Chinese have migrated to other countries, 4 million 
in the last ten years. The increase in Working age population (WAP) has been even more 
dramatic, +189 per cent, from 337 million to 974 million. 
This extraordinary demographic growth has been paralleled by equally notable changes 
in the age-structure and geographical distribution of the Chinese population. The weight of 
WAP has increased from 61.9 per cent to 71.9 per cent
13; the percentage of young people has 
decreased from 33.6 per cent to 19.9 per cent, and the proportion of the elderly has increased 
from 4.5 to 8.2 per cent. This radical transformation has been determined by an extremely 
rapid  decline  in  fertility  [the  Total  Fertility  Rate  (TFR)  has  decreased  from  6.11  to  an 
estimated value of 1.77] and a parallel rapid increase in life expectancy (from 40.8 to 73 
year
14).  
At  the  same  time,  according  to  national  statistics,  the  pace  of  urbanization  has 
progressively accelerated so that the share of urban population has risen from 12.5 per cent in 
1952 to 45.7 per cent in 2008, the last ten years accounting for one third of the total increase. 
These demographic trends have generated huge challenges in the areas of education 
and employment. 
Education - Between 1950 and 2010 births have amounted to 1,363 million, i.e. almost 
23 million per year. After a maximum of more than 28 million, reached between 1965 and 
1970, births have declined to an average yearly value of around 16-18 million in the last five 
years.  
Therefore,  the  first  challenge  China  had  to  face  was  a  tremendous  increase  in  the 
number of young people in the training phase of life. The 5-19 age bracket, a reasonable 
proxy of education demand, has increased from an initial value of 162 million to a maximum 
of 357 million in 1980. It has then slightly decreased to 324 million in 2005, to drop to 288 
million in 2010.  
Given  these  numbers, the  educational results  obtained  by  China  are to say  the  list 
remarkable. Around 1950 the literacy
15 rate was around 15-20%. According to Census data, 
the literacy rate had increased to around 66 per cent by 1964, to 77 per cent by 1982, to 84 per 
cent by 1990 and to 93 per cent by 2000.  
 
                                                        
11 To allow for international comparisons, unless differently indicated, the demographic data used in this section of 
the paper, including the 2010 estimates, are those published by the Population Division (2009). The differences 
with Chinese data will be discussed in following sections of the paper.  
12 According to national sources, in 1952 the Chinese population amounted to 575 million and in 2009 to 1.328 
million. 
13 The share of WAP did however decline until 1965 when it reached a minimum of 55.4 per cent. In that year the 
percentage of the 0-14 age group peaked at 40.2 per cent.  
14 The progress has been impressive both for men (from 39.3 to 71,3) and for women (from to 42.3 to 74.8). 
15 In 1950 the government set recognition of 1,000 characters as the standard for literacy and 300 for illiteracy. 
Until 1978, adult literacy was given priority. A reading primer for peasant was distributed in 1951 to rural people, 




16 the rate of illiteracy in the population aged 15 or more was estimated at 7.8 
per cent
17. It affected mainly women and the rural population
18. Most importantly, it was 
concentrated between the elderly. In the same year the percentage of population (aged 6 and 
over) with at least a senior secondary education, college or more had reached 20.4 per cent. 
Beijing  (51.5  per  cent),  Shanghai  (47.7  per  cent)  and  Tianjin  (40.2  per  cent)  lead  the 
provincial ranking followed, at notable distance, by the other provinces with values included 
between 25.4 per cent in Jilin and 5.1 per cent in Tibet. 
Employment - The second, even bigger, challenge that China had to face was creating 
a number of jobs coherent with a fast growing supply. As we have already seen, working age 
population -that we will define between 15 and 64 in accordance with international standard 
and  in  consideration  of  the  fact  that  agriculture  and  the  informal  economy  are  still  the 
dominating employment sectors- has increased by 189 per cent in 60 years.  
Also in this case flow data provide a more dramatic representation of the problem 
(Graph. 2).  During the sixty years we are considering, WAP has increased on the average by 
10.6  million  per  year,  as  a  difference  between  18.8  million  generational  entries  and  8.3 
million exits
19. Moreover, between 1950 and 1985 WAP balance grew from an average value 
of two million per year to an historical maximum of 18 million per year. After 1985 it has 
progressively declined to a minimum of 9.8 million between 1990 and 1995, a value that has 
also characterized the last five years, after having been slightly higher in the previous decade.  
Although employment data must be taken with extreme caution, there is no doubt that 
China’s employment performance has been impressive. According to official figures, between 
1952 and 2008 employment has grown, on the average, by 10.1 million per year.  
 
                                                        
16 The current literacy rate is set at 2,000 characters for urban dwellers and to 1,500 for rural dwellers.  
17 CNSB, 2009  
18 Women represent 74.1 per cent of the illiterate; 71.8% of the illiterate belong to the rural population.  
19 Generational entries are represented by the people who become 15 in the period considered. Exits include 
generational exits (the people who become 65), deaths in working age, and net migration. For a more formal 
definition of generational concepts and a description of a labour market stock-flow generational model see M. 
Bruni, 2009b.   8 
 
Two main phases must however be distinguished. In the first, covering the 1952-1991 
period,  total  employment  grew  at  an  average  yearly  rate  of  11.5  million  per  year,  the 
agricultural  sector  playing  a  major  role  and  contributing  for  almost  50  per  cent  to  total 
employment growth. In the second, the average annual growth declines to 7.1 million: the 
relative higher increases in industrial employment (4.2 million per year) and especially in 
services  (6.9  million  per  year)  are  partially  counterbalanced  by  an  average  decline  in 
agricultural employment by 5 million per year.  
 
 
These  tendencies  have  progressively  accelerated  and  in  the  2003-2008  period 
employment  in  agriculture  has  declined,  on  the  average,  by  11.8  million  per  year,  while 
employment in the other two main sectors has increased respectively by 10.1 and 7.8 million 
per  year.  It  must  also  be  pointed  out  that,  starting  in  2001,  the  rate  of  growth  in  total 
employment has progressively declined and has always remained at or below 1 per cent, with 
a minimum of 0.6 per cent in 2008.  
As a consequence, the share of the agricultural sector has declined to 39.6 per cent, 
while the shares of industry and services have increased respectively to 27.2 per cent and 33.2 
per cent
20.  
3. China’s demographic future  
3.1 The demographic projections of the Population Division   
The  United  Nations  Population  Division  publishes  demographic  projections  that 
represent the main reference point for national governments and international organizations. 
The  projections  are  based  on  the  2010  estimated  population  level  and  structure  and  on 
                                                        
20 In the same year agriculture ha contributed to GDP by 11.3 per cent, industry by 48.6 per cent, and services by 
40.1 per cent.    9 
alternative assumptions on fertility, mortality and international migration, the assumptions on 
fertility playing the major role
21.  
For what relates to China, the Population Division medium variant projection (the one 
that  is  normally  used,  being  considered  the  most  probable)  assumes  that  the  TFR  will 
progressively increase from the 2005-2010 estimated average value of 1.77 to 1.85 in the 
period between 2020 and 2025, and will then remain constant for the following 25 years. This 
assumption reflects the equilibrium hypothesis that still underlines demographic transition 
theory that fertility will, sooner or later, converge toward the equilibrium level of 2.1. In the 
case of China this goal has not been judged realistic and a sub-equilibrium level of 1.85 has 
been preferred.   
The low variant projection assumes that the TFR will remain 0.5 children below the 
level  hypothesized  by  the  medium  variant.  In  this  scenario  the  TFR  does,  therefore, 
progressively decline from 2010 to 2025 when it will reach a minimum of 1.35 children per 
woman and will then remain constant in the following 25 years
22.  
Table 2 compares the two variants: 
·  According to the medium variant projection, Total population will increase up to 
1930,  when  it  will  reach  a  maximum  of  1,462  million,  to  then  decline  to  1,417 
million in 2050; in the low variant the maximum is reached in 2020, juts below 1.4 
billion; total population then drops to 1,237 million in 2050;  
·  The number of young people steadily declines over the whole period, both in the 
optimistic (high fertility) and pessimistic scenario. The decline is obviously more 
pronounced in the latter (-137 million, -19.7 per cent.) than in the former (-53 million, 
-51 per cent);  
·  The 40 years time interval is not sufficient for different fertility levels to affect the 65 
and over age group; therefore, the number of elderly increases by 219 million (+197 
per cent) in both scenarios; 
·  WAP reaches a maximum of 998 million in 2015, to then progressively decline in the 
following 35 years. The two variants start to differ in 2030 due to the fact that the 
fertility rate begins to impact on WAP entries in 2025; between 2025 and 2050, WAP 
will  decline  by  126  million  (-12.8  per  cent),  according  to  the  medium  variant 
projection, by 222 million (-22.4 million) according to the low variant;  
·  As  a  consequence 
of the previous trends, the population age structure will undergo major changes: in 
both variants the shares of the young and of WAP progressively decline, while the 
shares of the elderly progressively increase. More specifically, in the medium variant 
the percentage of young people drops from 19.9 per cent in 2010 to 15.3 per cent in 
2050;  the  percentage  of  WAP  from  71.9  per  cent  to  61.4  per  cent,  while  the 
percentage of the elderly increases from 8.2 per cent to 23.3 per cent. In the low 
variant the decline in fertility determines an even more pronounced drop of the share 
of the young (to 10.7 per cent), a more pronounced increase of the share of the elderly 
(to 26.7 per cent), and therefore a lower decline of the share of WAP (to 62.6 per 
cent). 
 
                                                        
21 For 2008 the Population Division produced eight different scenarios: five differ only with respect to fertility 
trends  (low,  medium,  high,  constant,  instant-replacement  fertility).  The  other  three  are  based  on  the  medium 
variant scenario: the “constant mortality” variant differs with regard to the path followed by future mortality, the 
“no change” variant differs with respect to both fertility and mortality, the “zero migration” variant only with 
regard to the path followed by future international migration; see Population Division (2009).  
22 Both variants share the same hypothesis about mortality and international migration: life expectancy at birth is 
expected to progressively climb to 77.4 years for men and to 81.3 for women; international migration is set at 
around -300,000 per year.    10 
 
In  both  scenarios  generational  entries  into  WAP  are  characterized  by  a  long-run 
negative  trend  (Table  3).  However,  the  increase  in  fertility  hypothesized  by  the  medium 
variant determines an increase in entries between 2025 and 2035, while in the low variant 
entries decline in all five-year intervals. Both scenarios share the same amount of exits, and in 
both  scenarios  the  2025-30  period  marks  a  historical  moment  in  Chinese  demographic 
history: the beginning of a phase of uninterrupted structural decline of WAP. A temporary 
negative natural balance is however registered between 2015 and 2020, while in the following 




Graph 3 visualizes the generational flows of the two scenarios and the impact of the 
two fertility hypotheses on the number of entries and on the total balance of WAP.     11 
 
In  conclusion,  the  projections  of  the  Population  Division  show  not  only  that  the 
Chinese population is going to enter a period of fast and irreversible ageing, a phenomenon 
that has already attracted a lot of attention, but also that WAP will unavoidably decline even 
if the fertility rate would moderately increase up to 2025. The size of the decline depends on 
the dynamic of fertility, but is very relevant in both scenarios (-126 million in the medium 
variant, -222 million in the low variant).  
Since  in  both  variants  WAP  id  assumed  to  be  affected  by  around  12  million  net 
migrants, Replacement migration, as defined by the United Nations Report, can be estimated 
respectively at around 114 million and 210 million between 2025  -when WAP is expected to 
peak at 997 million- and 2050. To put this value in an international perspective we can recall 
that the UN Report on Replacement migration provides an estimate of 161 million for Europe 
between 2005 - when European WAP would reach a maximum of 493 million (around 50 per 
cent of the Chinese WAP in 2025)- and 2050, and of only 18 million for the USA, between 
2015 and 2050.  
3.2 Alternative demographic scenarios: 2008-2048   
The forecasts of the Population Division present, however, some serious shortcomings. 
In the first place, as we have just seen, both variants assume that in the next 40 years China 
will be affected by a consistent net migration balance. This hypothesis is based on past trends 
and it appears totally inconsistent with the WAP trends exhibited by the projections
23. The 
second, more important problem is represented by the fact that the age structure proposed by 
the Population Division largely differs from Chinese estimates.  
Chinese sources do not provide absolute values of the Chinese population by sex and 
five  year  age  group.  Two  sets  of  information  are  available.  The  first  provides  the  total 
population structure by three main age groups based on the results of the annual national 
sample survey on population changes
24; the second the actual structure, by sex and single 
year of age, estimated by the same survey.  
As table 4 indicates, there are notable differences between the three estimates. We will 
show that, ceteris paribus, such differences do strongly affect population projections and 
bring to different assessments of the dimension and urgency of the demographic problems 
China will experience in not too far a future.  
 
                                                        
23 For a detailed discussion of this point see M. Bruni, 2009a 
24 See China Population & Employment Statistics Yearbook 2009, note p.5.   12 
 
3.2.1The assumptions 
The goal of the paper is not that of providing full fledged demographic scenarios, a task 
that  should  be  urgently  undertaken  by  Chinese  Institutions,  but  to  discuss  the  impact  of 
demographic evolution on the labour market and, therefore, on the sustainability of Chinese 
economic growth and social development.  
Since we do not have any mean to assess the reliability of the sources, we will propose 
two projection of the Chinese population based on two different age structure in the base year 
(2008): the first (structure 1) is based on the estimates proposed by the Chinese National 
Statistical  Bureau  (CNSB);  the  second  (structure  2)  is  derived  from  the  estimates  of  the 
Population Division structure. More specifically: 
·  Structure 1 has been computed ri-proportioning the original weight of the five years 
age group of the sample survey on the basis of the adjusted weights of the main age 
groups computed by CNSB on the basis of the same survey;  
·  Structure 2 has been computed interpolating the 2005 and 2010 Population Division 
data  to  obtain  an  estimate  for  2008;  the  data  have  then  been  normalized  to  the 
population level estimated by CNSB
25. 
Therefore, in the base year, the two populations coincide with respect to the level, but 
differ with respect to the weight of the five-year age groups
26.  
Structure 1 is characterized by higher values of all generations born before 1970 and 
lower values of those born in the following years, the difference amounting to almost 40 





                                                        
25  The  level  of  the  total  population  obtained  trough  interpolation  is  very  close  to  the  estimate  of  the  CLSB 
(1329.01 versus 1328.02)  
26 The two structures suggest a very different evaluation of the level and timing of the decline in fertility that has 
affected China and, probably, of the level and timing of the ageing process.  
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·  According to structure 1, the most numerous age group is the 35-39, while according 
to structure 2 the most numerous age group is the 40-44; 
·  According  to  both  structures,  a  local  minimum  of  births  was  recorded  at  the 
beginning  of  the  ‘70s  and  a  local  maximum  at  the  beginning  of  the  80s;  both 
structures agree that, starting at the beginning of the ‘90s, the number of births has 
sharply declined.  
In opposition to standard practice, we will take the view that the demographic and 
economic spheres do strongly interact on, and through the labour market. In order to analyze 
the  impact  of  demographic  trends  on  labour  market  variables  and  then  the  demographic 
consequences of the labour market dynamics, what we need is a demographic canvass that 
allows discussing alternative sets of demographic, economic and labour policies.   
We have therefore projected the Chinese population over the 2008-2048 interval, using 
both the PD and CNSB population structures, on the simple hypothesis that the age-specific 
fertility  rates  and  the  age  and  sex-specific  mortality  rates  registered  in  2008  will remain 
constant,  and  that  no  international  migration  will  occur.  The  data  proposed  by  the  two 
scenarios do therefore depend mainly on the 2008 population structure.  
 
3.2.2 The demographic scenarios  
Table  4  summarizes  the  main  results  of  our  projections.  According  to  CNSB  data 
(scenario 1):  
·  WAP will increase during the 2008-13 period and then progressively decline from a 
peak value of 995 million to 785 million, loosing 210 million (-21.1 per cent) in 35 
years;  
·  The number of people in the 0-14 age bracket will steadily and progressively decline 
from 252 to 177 million (-75 million), and their weight will decrease from 19 to 13.5 
per cent; 
·  The number of elderly will peak at 370 million in 2038 and then decline to 347 
million; the share of the elderly will reach a maximum of almost 27 per cent in 2043;  
·  Total population will peak at 1.437 million in 2028; it will then decline to 1.309 
million in 2048 (-128 million). 
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According to PD data (scenario 2):  
·  WAP increases until 2018, it remains substantially stable in the following 5 years to 
then decline by 120 million; 
·  The decline of the 0-14 age bracket will be slightly higher than that in the previous 
scenario (-79 million), as well as the increase in the number of the elderly (+248 
million);  
·  At  the  end  of  the  period,  the  population  age-structure  is  characterized  by  higher 
shares of the young (14 per cent) and of WAP (61.6 per cent) and by a lower share of 
the elderly (24.4); 
·  Total population will peak just short of 1.5 billion in 2033 and will then decline by 60 
million in the following 15 years. 
The trends in the stock values of WAP are “explained” by generational flow data.  
In scenario 1 generational entries into WAP exceed exits only in the first time interval 
(graph 5). Starting in 2013, WAP balances become negative, due to a notable decline in 
entries and a relevant increase in exits, so that in the following 10 years WAP declines by 
around 49 million. Starting in 2023, exits start to decline, but continue to exceed entries and 
in the following 25 years WAP declines by other 160 million. As we have already seen, the 
end result is that between 2013 and 2048 WAP declines by 21.1 per cent (-210 million). The 
maximum  gap  between  entries  and  exits  is  registered  between  2028  and  2033  when  the 
largest generation - the one born at the end of the sixties- reaches retirement age. In this 




In scenario 2, due to the bigger size of the younger generations and the smaller size of 
the older generations that characterize the base year, entries continue exceeding exits until the 
2023-28 period and the negative balances remain lower than those of scenario 1 until 2038. In 
the last ten years we have considered, the absolute values of the balances of scenario 2 are 
bigger than those of scenario 1 (Graph 6). 
We can summarize the situation observing that between 2010 ands 2050:  
·  In scenario 1 entries average 15 million and exits 20 million;  
·  In scenario 2 entries average 17 million and exits 19 million; 
·  This generates an overall negative balance of 180 million in the first scenario and of 
57 million in the second.  
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However, the most relevant point is that in scenario 1, WAP peaks in 2013 and then 
declines by 210 million; in scenario 2, WAP peaks in 2023 and then declines by 120 million 
against a value of 160 million of scenario 1 in the same period. In conclusion, the different 
age structures proposed by CNSB and UN determine a different date for the beginning of 
WAP decline and a different size of the phenomenon. Both sources do however support the 
idea that, starting in 2023, the decline in WAP will be massive, so that in the following 25 
years Replacement migration (according to the United Nation definition) will be included 
between 4.8 million (PD data) and 6.4 million (CNBS data) per year. 
 
4   Labour market scenarios. 
The young Chinese people that will enter WAP between 2008 and 2023 are already 
born and their number can only be affected, in a minor way, by educational choices and 
policies.  In  substance,  until  2023  labour  supply  can  be  affected  only  by  changes  in 
participation rates and policy measures.  
In the following period, entries into and exits from WAP, and therefore entries into and 
exits from the labour market, will be affected by numerous factors, namely the number of 
births that will be registered between 2008 and 2023, the rhythm and typology of economic 
growth, as well as by the demographic, social and economic policies that will be enacted 
during  the same  period,  and  finally  by  the  immigration flows that  China  will  eventually 
register.  
Therefore,  while  for the first  period it  is  reasonable  to  produce labour  market  and 
demographic  scenarios,  including  estimates  of  Replacement  migration  according  to  the 
definition  we  have  proposed,  for  the  second  period  such  exercise  will  be  done  only  to   16 
understand which problems China will have to face if no international migration will take 
place, and to assess which measures should be immediately enacted.  
4.1 The 2008-2023 period   
4.1 Labour market hypotheses and employment data 
In order to build labour market and demographic scenarios we need to formulate a set 
of hypotheses on the future trends of the employment level and structure. 
Between 1993 and 2008 WAP has increased by 173 million (+21.8 per cent). In the 
same  period  China  has  created  around  107  million  jobs  (+16  per  cent).  The  growth  in 
employment has resulted from an increase of 177 million jobs in extra-agricultural sectors 
and  a  decline  of  70  million  jobs  in  agriculture.  Between  2003  and  2008,  the  decline  in 
agricultural employment has accelerated reaching almost 12 million per year, while extra-
agricultural  employment  has  increased,  on  the  average,  by  17.9  million  per  year.  Total 
employment has, therefore, increased by 6.1 million per year. China remains, however, a 
predominantly rural country, employment in agriculture still accounting for almost 40 per 
cent, with services at only 33 per cent. 
 
 
On the basis of the past employment trends, we have formulated the following, rather 
conservative, hypotheses on the employment trends that will characterize the 2008-23 period 
(table 7)
27: 
·  Total  employment  will  increase  by  60  million  against  the  107  registered  in  the 
previous  15  years;  the  average  annual  rate  will  progressively  decline:  5  million 
between 2008 and 2013, 4 million in the following five years period and 3 million 
between 2018 and 2023
28;  
·  Employment in agriculture will decrease by 120 million against the 70 million of the 
previous 15 year interval; on the average, 9 million in the first five years period, 8 in 
the second and 7 in the third;  
·  Employment in the extra-agricultural sectors will increase by 180 million against the 
116 million of the previous 15 years, at a declining average yearly rate of 14, 12 and 
10 million;  
·  Total  employment  will  therefore  climb  to  835  million  in  2023,  and  the  share  of 
employment in agriculture will decline from 39.6 to 22.3 per cent.  
                                                        
27 It must be underlined that in this part of the paper we are not interested in the way in which China will achieve 
the “goals” set by our hypotheses since this will not affect the conclusions we are going to derive.  
28 This corresponds to an average yearly rate of growth of 0,65 per cent in the first period, of 0.5 per cent in the 
second and of 0.37 per cent in the third.    17 
 
The labour market statistics published by the CNBS present some very relevant limits, 
the most important one being that no estimates are provided of the employment level by age 
groups. The available information on employment structure does, however, allow computing 
such data that have then been used to estimate the specific employment rates based on our 
two previous demographic structures in the base year.  
As  graph  7  shows,  the  specific  employment  rates  based  on  population  structure  1 
present the standard shape, with values above 90 per cent for the central age groups, values 
increasing with age for the younger age groups and values declining with age for the older 
age  groups. The  WAP age  distribution  based  on  population  structure 2,  characterized  by 
lower values of the younger generations and higher values of the older generations, produces 
lower employment rates for the young, extremely high values for the last cohorts and values 
above 100 for the 40-44 and 50-54 age groups. This indicates that there is no coherence 
between  the  population  age  structure  proposed  by  the  Population  Division  and  the 
employment age structure estimated by the Chinese Bureau of Statistics.  
 
 
This makes impossible to carry on a flow analysis, based on the comparison of the 
generational  turnover  generated,  on  one  hand,  by  employment  and,  on  the  other,  by 
population on the basis of this demographic scenario. We will therefore proceed on two steps. 
We  will  first  propose  labour  market  scenarios  based  on  a  stock  approach  that  allow 
comparing the implications of the demographic trends resulting from CNBS and PD data. A 
labour market scenario based on a flow approach will then be estimated in order to better 
discuss the dynamic implications of scenario 1. 
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4.2.1 The stock approach 
Table 8 reports the number of additional jobs (Additional labour demand) that will be 
created in each of the next three five-year intervals, according to the previous labour market 
hypotheses, the additional supply generated by demographic trends of scenarios 1 and 2, and 
the structural lack or excess of supply determined by demographic trends.  
Additional supply has been computed on the hypothesis that the total rate of activity 
(taken for convenience equal to the total rate of employment) will remain constant over the 
2008-2023 period. In 2008 the rate of employment was equal to 78.3 per cent, according to 
scenario 1 and to 80.5 per cent according to scenario 2
29. This, together with the different 
WAP  evolutions  of  the  two  scenarios,  determines  a  much  higher  additional  supply  for 
scenario 2 than for scenario 1.   
The difference between Additional supply and Additional demand of labour provides 
an estimate of what we define, if positive, “structural excess of labour supply”, if negative, 
“structural lack of labour supply”. It must be underlined that this datum is the result of the 
interaction  between  the  increase  in  employment  generated  by  economic  growth  and  the 
impact  of  demographic  trends  on  labour  supply,  therefore  of  the  interaction  of  the 
demographic and economic spheres on the labour market.   
 
 
The  different  age  structure  on  which  the  two  scenarios  have  been  built,  although 
providing a similar qualitative trend over the medium term, have a large impact on the size of 
the shortage of labour that will characterize the Chinese economy between 2008 and 2023. 
If the age structure estimated by the CNBS is correct, the national supply of labour will 
start to be insufficient in the present 5 year interval and the structural lack of labour supply 
will then rapidly expand to an average yearly value of more than 6 million between 2013 and 
2018, and to more than 8 million in the following five year period. According to scenario 2, 
labour supply will still be sufficient between 2008 and 2013, but a structural lack of labour 
supply, although of a much lower dimension (2 and 3 million per year), will characterize the 
following two intervals.  
An alternative and more intuitive way to capture this situation is the following. China 
could keep its extremely high rate of employment constant destroying, over a period of 15 
years, 75 or 10 million jobs, depending on whether the CNSB or PD population structure 
more closely reflects reality. Alternatively, if between 2008 and 2023, employment will grow 
at an average rate of 4 million per year, China will have to push its employment rate to 92 per 
cent in the first scenario and to 87.9 per cent in the second scenario.  
Both  situations  are  obviously  unrealistic.  On  one  hand,  the  reduction  of  the 
employment level is not a possible option if China wants to pursue its road to economic 
growth and social development. On the other, the hypothesis of raising the employment rate 
would imply to invert the present negative trend in participation provoked by the increase on 
the  average  duration of  education, by  the  ageing  process  of the labour force  and  by  the 
process of urbanization. It must also be underlined that no industrial country is characterized 
by a total rate of employment above 80 per cent.  
These data do, therefore, suggest that, under the hypothesis of “no policy change”, 
China will need migrant workers to sustain its economic growth. International data show that 
the net migration balance is always in excess of workers needs since migrant workers bring 
                                                        
29 The different rates of employment depend on the different value of WAP that in its turn is provoked by the 
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with them, or are followed by, family members, and more specifically that the ratio between 
the two variables is approximately equal to 1.5. Table 8 reports the estimates of Replacement 
migration (as defined in this paper) on the basis of the previous parameter.  
In scenario 1 Replacement migration progressively increases from 3.2 million in the 
first five-year interval, to 48 million in the second to 63 million in the third for a total value of 
113 million.  Scenario 2 presents a less dramatic situation: Replacement migration is needed 
only starting in the second period, when is estimated at 9 million; in the third period its value 
increases to 23 million, bringing the total value for the 10 year interval to 31 million. 
4.2.2 The flow approach 
A generational stock-flow
30 model
 allows analyzing the process through which young 
generations enter for the first time into the labour market due to i) the death and retirement of 
older  workers  (Replacement  demand)  and  ii)  the  creation  of  additional  jobs  (Additional 
demand).  The  level  of  Replacement  demand  depends  mainly  on  the  age  structure  of  the 
employed,  while  the  level  of  Additional  demand  is  determined  by  the  rate  of  economic 
growth, the rate of technological progress and the employment-income elasticity. The Total 
labour demand in terms of flow -given by the sum of Replacement demand and Additional 
demand- measures the total number of first entries into employment needed, on one hand, to 
replace the definitive exits of older workers and, on the other, to occupy additional jobs.  
The following table presents estimates of Replacement demand, Additional demand 
and Total Labour demand in terms of flows for the 2008-2023 period, articulated in three 
five-year  intervals.  Additional  demand  reflects  the  previous  hypothesis  of  employment 
growth; Replacement demand has been computed under the assumption of constant specific 
rates of employment.  
Replacement demand will progressively increase from an initial value of 73 million to 
almost  100  million  between  2018  and  2023,  due  to  the  fact  that  progressively  larger 
generations will reach retirement age, while the increasing average age of the employed will 
determine an increasing number of exits due to death. Taking into consideration the level of 
Additional demand that we have previously hypothesized, the Chinese labour market will 
need, almost 20 million generational entries into employment per year between 2008 and 




According to scenario 1, during the same period, generational entries into Labour Force 
(generational labour supply) will progressively decline (from an average yearly value of 18 
million less than 15 million) since progressively smaller generations will enter the working 
phase of life. Therefore, labour supply not only will constantly fall short of labour demand, 
but  the  difference  between  entries  into  the  labour  force  and  the  requested  entries  into 
employment will progressively increase from 8 million in the first period to 41 million in the 
last period.  According to our definition of Replacement migration, in order to equate labour 
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demand and labour supply, China will need  to import almost 12 million people in the first 
time interval, 40 million in the second, and 61 million in the third.    
In  conclusion,  between  2008  and  2023,  the  Chinese  labour  market  will  need  324 
million first time entries into employment (264 million to substitute the workers that will 
definitely leave the labour force and 60 million to occupy additional jobs). Our data show 
that, due to the decline in fertility that has affected the country between 1993 and 2008, 
generational entries into the labour force will amount to only 249 million, and therefore will 
not be sufficient even to replace the exits of older workers. The result is, as we have already 
seen, a dramatic structural lack of labour supply that could be offset only by importing 75 
million workers.  
The flow approach does therefore confirm the estimates of a Replacement migration of 
around 113 million, but suggests an higher value for the 2008-2013 period and slightly lower 
values for the following two periods.  
4.3 The 2023-2048 period 
In  the  2023-2048  time  interval, the  two  demographic  scenarios  we have  produced, 
using CNSB and PD data, present a much higher level of similarity than those of the previous 
period. In both scenarios WAP balances are negative in all five years intervals, and their 
values tend to converge. As we have already seen, WAP will decline by around 160 million, 
according to Scenario 1, and by around 120 million according to Scenario 2 (Graphs 5 and 6, 
and table 5). In the perspective of the PD Report
31, these two values measure the level of 
Replacement migration required to keep WAP constant. 
Replacement  migration,  as  it  has  been  defined  in  this  paper,  (i.e.  the  amount  of 
immigration needed to satisfy the structural lack of local labour supply) will depend not only 
on demographic trends, but also on employment growth. Assuming, for instance, a rate of 
participation of 80 per cent, the decline in labour supply from 2023 to 2048 would be of 128 
million in Scenario 1 and 96 million in Scenario 2. If over this time interval China would 
create 100 million jobs (4 millions per year), the Chinese labour market would be affected by 
a  structural  lack  of  labour  supply  of  respectively  228  million  and  196  million  and 
Replacement migration would amount respectively to 343 million and to 294 million.  
Even more astonishing is the fact that in scenario 1 the level of Replacement migration 
would peak at almost 18 million per year between 2028 and 2033, and in scenario 2 at more 
than 14 million between 2033 and 2038 (graph. 8)*.  
 
Both scenarios do therefore suggest that, everything else constant, the lack of labour 
supply  not  only  will  become  a  structural factor  of the  Chinese  economy,  but  due  to the 
dimension  of  the  Chinese  population,  its  size  will  be  larger  than  that  registered  by  any 
developed country affected by below replacement fertility.  
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It  must,  however,  be  clear  that  what  we  have  presented  are  not  forecasts,  but 
projections based on very specific assumptions on: 
· Population structure on the base year 
· Fertility rates  
· Mortality rates  
· Employment age-structure  
· Employment growth  
and, even more important, under the assumption of “no policy change”, an assumption that in 
the long run can play a crucial role.  
5. Structural lack of labour supply, replacement migration and policies  
The Replacement Migration Report of the United Nations Population Division argued: 
“among  the  demographic variables,  only  international  migration  could  be  instrumental in 
addressing population decline and population ageing in the short to medium term”
32. This 
conclusion stands on the simple argument that an increase in fertility would have only a 
minor  impact  that,  moreover,  would  be  felt  with  a  delay  of  at  least  20  years,  while  the 
reduction in mortality would continue to be an overriding policy goal in every country. As I 
have  already  noted,  the  Report  does  not  provide  a  sound  theoretical  explanation  of  why 
countries with below replacement fertility should need immigrants: a contraction of WAP is 
not by itself a sufficient reason to provoke immigration, as shown by the present global crisis, 
nor, under special circumstances, a necessary reason and the same can be said of a decline in 
total population or an increase in the Potential support ratio.  
Our thesis is that the decline in WAP determines a reduction in the supply of labour 
and once unemployment has been brought to the frictional level, the activity rate of the local 
population have expanded to the physiological level, the excess of labour supply available in 
the less developed areas of the country have been absorbed via internal migration, then only 
immigration will allow a country to sustain economic growth.  
It should be pointed out that economic immigration could be needed and occur before 
all previous requirements are fulfilled. In modern societies, and China is no exception, labour 
is far from homogeneous and the supply for many occupations could become insufficient long 
before a frictional level of unemployment is reached. The institutional setting could prevent 
even large segment of labour supply to enter the labour market. For instance, in absence of 
adequate social services for the care of the children and of the elderly, women could be 
obliged or find economically more convenient to abstain from work. A restrictive legislation 
or the lack of sufficient information could prevent or discourage internal migration, necessary 
to bring workers where they are needed. Finally, a lack of labour supply could emerge even in 
the presence of a constant or slowly growing WAP in the measure in which employment 
growth would exceed the possible growth in labour supply.  
Up to now the dimension of the Chinese population, the widespread idea that China has 
a vast reservoir of underutilized agricultural labour –in 2003 it was estimated in around 150 
million people by IMF 
33-, have not allowed considering the possibility that China could face 
a large, long lasting structural lack of human resources. But the fact is that China has rushed 
through  the  same  demographic “transition”  that  has  brought  all  developed  countries to a 
situation of structural lack of labour supply and has already determined massive immigration 
phenomena.  
In 2000 the total WAP of USA, Canada, Australia, EU15 countries and Russia was 
estimated at 577 million, i.e. 69 per cent of China’s WAP. In the following five years these 19 
countries  registered  an  increase  in  employment  of  19.5  million,  similar  to  that  we  have 
hypothesized for China between 2013 and 2018. In the same period the labour supply of these 
19 countries increased by 9.7 million. The result was a structural lack of labour supply of 9.8 
million and a migration balance of 16.7 million
34. We have moreover to consider that in all 19 
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countries the total activity rate was lower that that recorded by China (allowing the possibility 
that the need of foreign labour could be faced by an increase in labour market participation) 
and that the real migration balance has been certainly higher than that indicated by the official 
figures we have reported.  
The scenarios we have proposed, the model on which they are based, the empirical 
evidences  provided  by  international  comparisons  should  be  sufficient  to  take  into 
.consideration the fact that China will have to face a serious, structural shortage of labour. In 
my opinion the real issue is not whether China labour supply will become insufficient, but 
when will this happen, how large will be the structural lack of labour supply and whether 
China  will  become  the  greatest  importer  of  labour  or  suitable  policies  could  provide 
alternative solutions.  
The first problem is timing. Our elaborations have shown that in this respect the crucial 
factor is the age structure of the Chinese population. If Chinese data are correct, the supply of 
labour will start to become insufficient in the next few years. If the population structure 
proposed by the UN is correct, the lack of labour supply will become manifest at the middle 
of  the  present  decade.  We  have  however  to  point  out  that  this  forecast  is  based  on  the 
assumption that entries in the working phase of life take place at 15. The present average 
duration of education suggests that young people enter into the labour market at an average 
higher age, probably around 19-20. Since the size of the younger generations declines with 
age, this implies that, everything else constant, the shortage could appear with a few years of 
delay with respect to our forecasts, the generations entering the labour market in any period 
being larger than the ones we have considered. In conclusion, it is reasonable to expect that in 
the first case the shortage of labour will be a very visible and evident problem around 2015, in 
the second around 2020. 
It  has  also  been  shown  that  the  size  of  the  structural  lack  of  labour  supply  does 
crucially depend on the dimension of the younger generations. If UN data are correct, the 
problem is going to be severe, but if Chinese data are correct the lack of labour supply will 
assume huge dimensions even before the end of this decade.  
A correct evaluation of the age structure of the population is, therefore, fundamental in 
order to get a reliable assessment of the timing and size of the labour shortage China will 
have to face in the next years. This should represent a priority goal for the CNBS. 
The  demographic  data  provided  by  both  sources  bring,  however,  to  the  same 
conclusion, that in the long run China is going to be affected by a labour shortage of large 
dimensions, which bring us to the basic issue that this paper wants to raise: is China going to 
become not only the biggest economy, the bigger exporter of goods, but also the bigger 
importer of labour? Are there measures that if timely and effectively implemented will allow 
China to avoid this for the moment unexpected historical turn of events that not only could 
strongly affect the social fabric of China, but also jeopardize its economic aspiration or at 
least require a faster than programmed change in its typology of economic growth? 
The only possible way to avoid or reduce migration is obviously that of eliminating or 
reducing the structural lack of labour supply. According to the model we have proposed, the 
lack of labour supply is generated by the concurrent impact of demographic and economic 
factors. On one hand, by the decline in WAP, that in its turn is provoked by the relative size 
of entries into and exit from the working phase of life and, on the other, by the increase in the 
employment level that depends on the rate of economic growth and the typology of economic 
development  pursued  by  a  country.  A  third  factor  is  represented  by  the  labour  market 
participation of the local population: an increase in the rate of activity can partially offset the 
lack of labour supply, while a decline in participation will have the opposite effect
35.  
We have therefore to explore if and in which measure it is possible to reduce the 
demographic determinants of the lack of labour supply, i.e. the unbalance between entries in 
to and exits from WAP; if and in which measure it is possible to intervene on the economic 
sphere reducing the increase in employment without affecting economic growth; if and in 
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which measure it is possible to keep or enlarge the presence of the local population in the 
labour market and how effective these measures can be in relation to the estimated lack of 
labour supply.  
From a labour market perspective, this boils down to analyze which  measures can 
increase the supply of labour and which measure can reduce the demand of labour in order to 
minimize the difference.  
5.1 The supply side  
5.1.1 Is it possible to increase Working age population?  
In a dynamic perspective the decline in WAP is the result of a quantitative mismatch 
between entries and exits. The number of entries depends mainly on the number of births that 
have taken place 15 years before and the exits on the number of births that have taken place 
65 years before, deaths in working age playing a relatively rather important, but diminishing 
role
36. 
 As we have already argued, entries into the labour force take place with a delay with 
respect to entries in WAP that depends on the average duration of education, and that we will 
take equal to a 5 year period to facilitate computation. The first obvious conclusion is that for 
the next 20 years the young Chinese that will enter the working phase of life are already born 
and that changes in the number of births will affect the level of labour supply proposed by our 
scenarios only starting in 2028.  
The  only  relevant  questions  with  reference  to  WAP  entries  are  therefore  long  run 
questions: how much should the number of birth increase in order to ensure a future WAP 
natural equilibrium? Is the required growth achievable and which measures and policies could 
foster it?   
For what relates to the first question the two scenarios present very different answer for 
the first 15 years, but converging data in the long run. According to scenario 1, in order to 
avoid  the  demographic  causes  of  the  forecasted  lack  of  labour  supply  in  the  2023-2038 
period, the number of births should increase over the forecasted level (computed under the 
hypothesis  of  constant  specific  rates  of  fertility  and  no  policy  change)  by  26.7  per  cent 
between 2008 and 2013, by a maximum of 62.4 per cent in the following five year and by 
56.8 per cent between 2018 and 2023. The corresponding values for scenario 2 are 7.4 per 
cent, 25.8 per cent and 40.7 per cent. Both scenarios do then agree that in order to bring WAP 
to a situation of natural equilibrium around the middle of the century the amount of births 
forecasted for the 2028-2033 period should increase by more than one third.  
 
The number of births depends on the rate of fertility and on the number of women in 
fertile age.   
                                                        
36 According to our estimates, in scenario 1, the percentage of employment due to death decline from 18.6 
per cent between 2008 and 2013 to 11.9 per cent between 2033 and 2038, to then increase to 14.6 per cent 
between 2043 an 2048. In other words every year between 2 to 3 million young people can find a job due to 
the death of people in Working age.    24 
At present China is still enforcing the one-child policy that was implemented in 1980 
and  whose  impact  has  received  very  different  assessments  as  shown,  for  example,  by  a 
comparison between the population official age structure and the age structure proposed by 
UN. After remaining stable for the first ten year, although during that period the one-child 
policy was very harshly implemented
37, the Chinese TFR has plunged below replacement 
level in a period in which the Chinese society was affected by all the phenomena normally 
associated with a decline in fertility: the employment level in agriculture sharply fell, while 
the percentage of urban population rapidly expanded, the level of educational attainment and 
the average standard of living increased. During the same period, the one-child policy slowly 
evolved in to a multi-policy regime that has resulted in what has been estimated a 1.5 child 
policy. It is, therefore, extremely difficult to evaluate in which measure the decline in fertility 
has been due to population planning and in which measure to socio-economic-development; 
even more difficult to evaluate the quantitative impact of abolishing the one-child policy.  
Coming to the number of women in fertile age, according to Chinese sources, their 
number will progressively and sharply decline between 2008 and 2023 (-61 million, -17.3 per 
cent); according to PD data the number of women in fertile age will peak in 2013, but will 
then decline by around 30 million in the following 10 years (-8.2 per cent).  
 
The previous observations seem to support the idea that even the immediate abolition 
of the one-child policy will have minor effects on the size of future generations. While a short 
term baby boom could be generated by the unfulfilled desires of a certain number of couples 
and  of  their  extended  families,  it  appears  probable  that  the  process  of  urbanization,  the 
increase in educational attainment, the changes in the traditional vision of the family brought 
about by increasing contacts with Western culture will then produce a return to the negative 
trend  in  fertility  that  has  characterized  the  last  20  years.  Moreover,  given  the  expected 
increase in the duration of the training phase of life, the impact on the labour market of an 
improbable long lasting baby boom would be felt only after around 20-25 years.  
As it is evident that no foreseeable increase in fertility of the Chinese population will 
be able to bring back WAP natural equilibrium before the half of the century, so it is evident 
that the Chinese government should not only immediately abolish any legal restriction to 
fertility, but adopt all possible social and economic measures that could refrain the TFR from 
continuing  along  the  present  negative  trend.  The  experiences  of  other  countries  show, 
however, that the impact of such measures is in general very limited. A government can be 
successful in enforcing reproduction restrictions; much more difficult to induce people to 
have more children.  
In this perspective the Chinese Government should immediately start to consider other 
measures aimed to increase WAP entries. One possibility is to extend the policies aimed to 
attract young foreigners to study in Chinese schools and universities and then facilitate their 
stay in the country. The relative advantage of such a measure (whose quantitative impact will 
however be rather limited) with respect to workers immigration is that these young people 
will have some knowledge of the Chinese language and way of life before entering the local 
labour market. In the same direction it would be advisable to consider measures that would 
promote  and  facilitate  the  return  of  the  Chinese  working  abroad.  Also  in  this  case 
international data suggest that no quantitatively relevant results must be expected, but that 
returning migrants can play a relevant role in promoting a modern economic culture.  
If it is impossible to increase labour market generational entries for at least 20 years 
acting on fertility and it is highly improbable that a consistent reduction in WAP decline will 
                                                        
37 This result was partially due to the lowering of the legal age of marriage at the beginning of the ‘80s.    25 
derive from the increase in births up to the middle of the century, it is also evident that 
nothing can be done in order to decrease the number of exits.  
Increasing the legal age of retirement would, in fact, create only a temporary window 
during which WAP exits would decline, to then go back to the forecasted level after a number 
of years equal to that of the increase in the legal age of retirement.  
In conclusion, the measures that could be adopted in order to increase the size of WAP 
acting upon natural entries and exits will have only marginal or temporary effects and cannot 
be expected to solve the structural problem and bring WAP back to a situation of natural 
equilibrium, at least for the next 40 years.  
5.1.2 Measures to fully exploit the local supply of labour  
Let’s now consider the measures that could increase the size of the labour force, for 
any given level of WAP.  
The first possibility is to increase the legal age of retirement. While, as we have seen in 
the  previous  paragraph,  such  a  measure  would  have  only  temporary  effects  from  a  flow 
perspective, it would have a permanent effect on the number of cohorts co-present in the 
labour market and, therefore, on the potential stock of labour supply. This measure would 
also be on line with the suggestion often made by International Organizations that countries 
with  fertility  rates  below  replacement  level  should  strive  to  increase  the  labour  market 
participation of specific socio-economic groups characterized by a relatively low presence in 
the labour market, namely women and older people. 
It  must,  however,  be  considered  that  the  Chinese  labour  market  presents  special 
features. Its total rate of employment is certainly one of the highest in the world. At more than 
78  per  cent it  compares favorably  with the  75.2  per  cent  recorded  by Japan and  largely 
exceeds the 65.5 per cent of EU15 (both data refer to 2005). Men, not only register specific 
rates of employment above 90 per cent for all central age groups, but also very high rates for 
all the other age groups. More specifically, although the legal age of retirement is presently 
set at 60, men in the 60-64 age bracket register a rate of employment of 63 per cent. Women’s 
rates of employment are above 80 per cent in correspondence of all central age groups, and 
the gender differential is relevant only for the age groups above 55, women’s legal retirement 
age (graph. 8). As a consequence, the gender differential is extremely low (82.1 per cent for 
men and 74.5 per cent for women). Therefore, even the abolition of the legal retirement age 
would not significantly increase the size of the labour force.  
 
Moreover, as we have already noted, in the next years the percentage of young people 
present in the labour market will progressively decline since the increase in per capita income 
will allow more and more families to realize the desire to give children a better education, an 
objective in line with national policies and the needs of an expanding modern service sector.  
The structural lack of labour supply can be reduced through a more efficient use of the 
available  labour  force.  A  situation  of  declining  labour  supply  raises  the  probability  of 
geographical unbalances compounded with unbalances at the occupation level. Free mobility 
over the territory and information are the obvious tools to face such problems.    26 
The first implication is, therefore, that any limitation to free labour circulation should 
be  abolished.  Moreover,  internal  migration  should  be  sustained  by  employment  services 
capable of providing information and recruitment over the whole territory
38, and linking the 
growing urban demand with the supply in rural areas.  
The development of long run forecasts of the demand of labour by occupations should 
be developed in order to plan a coherent structure of the educational offer, paying special 
attention to vocational training. The goal is to strive for a long-run coherence between the 
structure of exits from schools and vocational centers, on one side, and labour demand by 
occupations on the other.  
Let’s finally consider the widely spread idea that China has a vast reservoir of rural 
labour. We observe first of all that our previous analysis has been conducted at the global 
level and therefore allows for any possible amount of inter-sector labour mobility. In the 
second place, we have explicitly assumed a decline in agricultural employment of 39 per cent 
between 2008 and 2023. To fully understand the implications of this hypothesis we have to 
view the problem using a generational perspective and therefore considering the employment 
age structure both at the total level, and in the main sectors
39. The necessary employment data 
by age group have been estimated on the base of CNSB data.  
They show that the employed in agriculture are, on the average, considerably older than 
those in the non-agricultural sectors, the weight of the generations up to 44 being lower and 
the weight of the generations above 45 being higher (graph. 9). As a consequence, while in 
2008 employment in agriculture represents around 40 per cent of total employment, in the 
following 15 years natural exits from agriculture will exceed 50 per cent of total exits (i.e. 
around  130  million).  Therefore,  under  our  hypothesis  of  a  contraction  in  agricultural 
employment  of  120  million  over  the  same  time  interval,  the  agricultural  sector  cannot 
represent a potential source of labour supply. Employment in agriculture will progressively 
decline mainly because of a very low substitution of older generations by the incoming ones, 
while direct passages of agricultural workers to other sectors will play a marginal role. Rural 
families will, however, continue to represent a potential source of labour because the large 
majority of their descendants will move to the more attractive urban areas. This will end up 
provoking in not too far a future a lack of labour supply also for the agricultural sector. 
 
 
                                                        
38 According to an ADB document (ADB, 2006), around 120 million workers had migrated from rural to 
urban areas in the previous 20 years in search of improved employment and income and it was expected 
that the phenomenon would continue at an average rate of 10 million per year. Only 15 per cent of the 
migrant had received assistance from publicly supported ES.  According to the same document: ”The current 
ES system no longer meets ES needs … Processes, information systems, and staffing levels are inadequate to 
meet current needs and urgently need to be reviewed and strengthened.  An improvement of the ES would 
not only reduce the costs of migration supported by workers, but would lead to more orderly and effective 
rural-urban migration and contribute to a more balanced development.  
39 The analysis will be conducted using the CNSB data since employment by age group is coherent only with 
WAP data coming from this source.   27 
This  conclusion,  that  will  certainly  look  even  more  farfetched  than  the  previous 
assertion that China as a whole will need foreign labour, is however supported by the future 
demographic trend of rural areas and by the experience of other countries.  
At the beginning of the ’60 the Italian employment structure by sector was similar to 
that  registered  by  China  today,  while  the  country  was  entering  into  a  phase  of 
industrialization and modernization. Agricultural employment was, as in China today, around 
40 per cent of total employment and it was assumed that it could represent a vast reservoir of 
labour. In fact, the downsizing of the sector took place according to the pattern we have just 
indicated and it was brought about mainly by the non-substitution of older workers by new 
generations. Inter-sector mobility was very limited, while the sons of rural families provided 
an  important  contribution to the labour  needs  of the  industries located  in  Northern  areas 
already affected by a structural lack of labour supply. At the beginning of the ’80 the Italian 
agricultural sector started to use (illegal) immigrants and now foreign workers represent a 
fast-growing structural element of the Italian rural landscape.  
5.2 The demand side  
It has often been suggested that a decline in WAP can be faced by an increase in labour 
productivity
40.  In  China,  Cai  Fang,  Director  of  the  Institute  of  Population  and  Labor 
Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has proposed this thesis at the end of 
2006 
41. After having acknowledged that “China’s oversupply of labour is on its way to 
becoming a thing of the past”
42, Cai Fang maintained that “China should adjust to the change 
by cultivating greater productivity. When labor becomes scarcer, economic growth should be 
based on increased productivity”.  
A  high  rate  of  technological  change,  a  growth  process  based  on  capital-intensive 
sectors,  everything  else equal,  will  certainly  lower the  employment-income  elasticity  and 
therefore the need of additional labour. The real question is, however, a different one: can the 
increase  in  productivity  offset  a  structural  lack  of  labour  supply?  This  would  imply  an 
increase in productivity that exceeds the percentage increase in production by an amount 
equal to the percentage increase in employment. In our case, in order to offset a structural 
lack of 75 million workers over the next 15-year, the percentage increase in productivity 
would have to exceed the percentage increase in production by 10.2 per cent, a result that no 
country has ever realized and that appears totally out of reach in an economic phase that will 
register an accelerated growth of the service sector. For the same reason even the possibility 
to offset the much smaller lack of supply generated by the population structure estimated by 
the PD through increases in productivity appears unrealistic.  
 
5.3 Conclusions 
A country that has been characterized by a long period of below replacement fertility 
will necessarily enter a phase in which WAP will decline.  This will determine a reduction in 
labour  supply  that,  together  with  the  growth  in  employment,  will  determine  a  structural 
shortage of labour. This structural problem allows only for a structural solution: the return to 
a situation of positive demographic growth. During the phase of structural lack of labour 
supply a country should enact all possible measures that can reduce as much as possible the 
difference  between  demand  and  supply  of  labour,  but  should  also  be  aware  that  such 
measures will have a limited effect.  
 
                                                        
40 This solution was for instance proposed after the presentation in Los Angeles of the UN Report by ….The same  
41 Cai Fang, 2006, “How to deal with the Future Labour Shortage”, China Daily, 03/09  
42 More recently a different assessment of the future trend in labour supply has been proposed by Ma Li, former 
director of the same Institute and presently counselor to the State Council on population issues. According to Ma 
Li, the Chinese labour force will be sufficient to maintain economic development for at least the next 40 years. 
According to estimates produced by the Migrant Population Management Division of the National Population and 
Family Planning Commission, Ma Li has stated that the Chinese labour supply will peak in 2016 and 2026 and by 
2050 its value will be equal to the 2020 value that will be above the 2009 level. See Song Wei, 2010.   28 
In such a situation, only international migration can close the gap between labour 
demand and labour supply. 
 
In the case of China, it is evident that given the demographic trends and its economic 
implication,  the  one-child  policy  and  the  present  restriction  to  geographical  mobility  are 
anachronistic and should be substituted by measures acting in the opposite direction. Other 
measures to be considered in the very near future include an enlargement of the number of 
cohorts in working age, the empowerment of Employment services that should be able to 
provide an efficient, on real-time information over the whole territory, a careful planning of 
the educational offer in order to reduce as much as possible the qualitative mismatch in the 
labour  market.  To  support  the  timely  enactment  of  such  polices,  an  assessment  of  the 
demographic and labour market information presently available should be carried on as soon 
as possible. This would allow building reliable labour market and demographic scenarios.  
Up  to  this  moment  we  have  considered  labour  demand  as  exogenous.  This  was 
necessary in order to estimate scenarios of structural lack of supply. It is however evident that 
in reality demographic trends and economic development are interconnected.   
6. From unlimited supply of labour to structural lack of labour supply.  
In 1954, when W.A. Lewis wrote his seminal article on the role that an unlimited 
supply of labour could play in fostering economic growth in developing countries, he could 
not forecast the demographic tendencies that have characterized China and its extraordinary 
economic success, partially based, as Lewis had suggested, on the presence of an unlimited 
supply of labour.  
Lewis did not provide an explanation of how and why certain countries, in a given 
moment  of  their  history,  happen  to  be  characterized  by  an  unlimited  supply  of  labour. 
Adopting a static stock approach, he simply stated that “an unlimited supply of labour may be 
said to exist in those countries where population is so large relatively to capital and natural 
resources, that there are large sectors where the marginal productivity of labour is negligible, 
zero, or even negative.” and that: ”The existence of a situation of unlimited supply of labour 
is made evident by the fact that the supply of labour exceeds demand at the subsistence 
level.”
 The role of demography is introduced only to note that the unlimited supply of labour 
can be fueled by population growth.  
The decline in WAP being not foreseeable, Lewis concluded that it would be capital 
accumulation to create a shortage of labour and raise wages above the subsistence level, in 
presence  of  a  positive  rate  of  population  growth:  “..  we  can  say  that  if  conditions  are 
favorable for the capitalist surplus to grow more rapidly than population, there must come a 
day when capital accumulation has caught up with labour supply”.  
The  situation  considered  by  Lewis  is  obviously  different  from  the  one  we  are 
discussing: in one case, the problem is the transition from an unlimited to a limited supply of 
labour, in the other, a much more dramatic transition from an unlimited supply of labour to a 
structural lack of labour supply. This, as well the unexpected role played by demography in 
bringing to an end a situation of unlimited supply of labour, does not infringe the relevance of 
Lewis’ conclusions: “When capital accumulation catches up with the labour supply, wages 
begin to rise above the subsistence level, and the capitalist surplus is adversely affected.  
However if there is still surplus labour in other countries, the capitalists can avoid this in one 
of two ways, by encouraging immigration or by exporting their capital to countries where 
there is still abundant labour at a subsistence wage”.  
Lewis’ discussion of the role of immigration is far from exhaustive. He simply argues 
that mass immigration could keep the wage level near the subsistence level, and that “The 
export of capital is a much easier way out for the capitalists, since trade unions are quick to 
restrict  immigration,  but  much  slower  in  bringing  the  export  of  capital  under  control”. 
Similarly  the  analysis  of  the  second  option  (the  export  of  capital)  could  not  reflect  the 
complexity of today global economy.  
A  thorough  discussion  of  the  implication  of  a  structural  lack  of  labour  supply  on 
economic growth, of the solutions suggested by Lewis, and of their consequences in the   29 
Chinese  case  exceeds  the  scope  of  this  paper  as  should  be  based  upon  more  reliable 
demographic  data,  and  therefore  more  reliable  labour  and  demographic  scenarios.  Some 
general observations can however be outlined.  
Let’s observe, first of all, that developed countries faced by structural lack of labour 
supply have been exporting capital, while receiving a growing amount of immigrants. I am 
not aware of any empirical analysis connecting capital export with lack of labour supply. 
What seems, however, evident is that in no instance capital export has been sufficient to 
prevent immigration to grow at approximately the same rate as the structural lack of labour 
supply.  
It is moreover evident that if our projections will be proven correct, the implications of 
mass immigration will be numerous and far-reaching not only for the economic sphere but 
also at the social and political level.  
China is still an underdeveloped country and economic growth is necessary to increase 
the standard of living and more generally its level of social development, while ensuring that 
the greater wealth will be equitably shared among the Chinese population. Therefore, the goal 
of immigration cannot be that of keeping wages at the subsistence level, but of avoiding 
wages to increase faster than productivity; to allow a progressive shift from labour intensive 
to capital intensive production not only in the industrial sector, but also in the agricultural 
sector -a process that would avoid boosting even more the need of foreign labour-, while 
keeping the competiveness of Chinese products; to maintain the attractiveness of the Chinese 
market for foreign investments, an attractiveness  that is not based only on cheap labour, but 
also on consideration of social and political stability, and the growing importance of the local 
market. 
In order to do so the first goal of China should be that of reducing, as much as possible, 
the structural lack of labour supply through an integrated set of social and labour policies, 
such  as  those  we  have  previously  indicated.  In  the  second  place,  the  governance  of  the 
immigration process should be based, on one hand, on correct quantitative and qualitative 
evaluation of the future level and structure by occupations of the lack of labour supply and, 
on the other, on a correct regulatory system.  
In this respect the lesson coming from the western world is very clear. A myopic vision 
based on the position, often justified only on ideological basis, that no foreign work is in fact 
really needed has provoked the adoption of restrictive immigration policies. This has brought, 
on one hand, to expensive measures to control the borders, measures that have however failed 
to interrupt the large illegal immigration flows required by the market. On the other, has 
provided a lucrative market for criminal organizations, has provoked the deaths of thousands 
of  immigrants,  many  children  and  women,  trying  to  cross  militarized  borders  with  any 
possible mean, and the exploitation of an illegal labour force without any contractual power. 
The presence of a growing number of illegal migrants has then resulted in social tensions and 
brought to the necessity of frequent and costly processes of legalizations.  
Chinese economic polices have always been inspired by a very pragmatic approach. It 
is to be hoped that a pragmatic attitude will characterize China’s policy on migration. Our 
analysis has shown that China’s future economic growth will require large immigration flows 
and that the demographic and labour market policies that can and should be adopted will only 
marginally decrease the level of structural lack of labour supply that will affect the Chinese 
labour market. If this result will be confirmed by more refined statistical analysis, China will 
have two possible choices. It can follow the Western “example” and fall in the trap of letting 
the lack of supply to be filled by illegal immigrants, with all the consequences that we have 
previously outlined. Alternatively, it can break with this “tradition” and try to govern the 
phenomenon to the advantage of its own citizens and of its international reputation. In this 
case China should establish in advance the amount of immigration needed to reach the goals 
of balanced growth we have previously indicated and govern the immigration flows with 
correct and human measures, inside a far-sighted institutional frame that should include the 
necessary policies of integration.  
Such approach could also be an important instrument for China’s international policy. 
In  this  perspective,  the  need  of  foreign  labour  could  represent  a  powerful  political  and   30 
economic tool for a country that needs natural resources often available in countries that will 
be affected by a growing structural excess of labour supply. The dimension of the need of 
foreign labour we have forecasted implies also that China could play a major role in starting 
or sustaining the economic development in the countries of departure, providing the premises 
for relevant flows of remittances. This would strongly enhance China’s political role in the 
global arena and in the international leadership.  
Paraphrasing Engels, it is to be hoped that if at some stage China will be obliged to 
regulate the import of human resources, it will be the first society to carry out the process in 
an intelligent and informed way, having in mind not only the well being of its citizens, but 
also that of the citizens of departures countries.  
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